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Trail disclosure is the leakage of privacy sensitive data, resulting 
from negligence, attack or abusive scrutinization or usage of per-
sonal digital trails. To prevent trail disclosure, data degradation is 
proposed as an alternative to the limited retention principle. Data 
degradation is based on the assumption that long lasting purposes 
can often be satisfied with a less accurate, and therefore less sen-
sitive, version of the data. Data will be progressively degraded 
such that it still serves application purposes, while decreasing 
accuracy and thus privacy sensitivity.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.2.7 [Database Administration]: Security, integrity, and pro-
tection 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Management, Security, Human Factors 
Keywords 
Privacy, limited retention, data degradation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Personal digital trails are difficult to protect. As any data, they are 
exposed to accidental disclosures resulting from negligence or 
piracy. The personal details of 25 million UK citizens have been 
recently lost inadvertently and some of the data published by 
AOL about Web search queries of 657,000 Americans have been 
deanonymized. Even the most defended servers (including those 
of Pentagon, FBI and NASA) are successfully attacked. But more, 
personal digital trails are often weakly protected by obscure and 
loose privacy policies which are presumed accepted when exer-
cising a given service. This fosters ill-intentioned scrutinization 
and abusive usages justified by business interests, governmental 
pressures and inquisitiveness among people. No one is sheltered 
because common events, like applying for a job or a credit, can 
suddenly make anybodies’ digital trail of utmost interest for 
someone else. Companies like Intelius or ChoicePoint make scru-
tinization their business while others like ReputationDefender 
provide a lucrative service to destroy the sensitive part of personal 
digital trails subject to scrutinization. 
We define trail disclosure as the leakage of data pertaining to a 
personal digital trail and resulting from negligence, attack or abu-
sive scrutinization or usage. By definition, its occurrence assumes 
that all security mechanisms have been bypassed or that the ac-
cess control policy has been defined too weakly. Promoted by 
most legislation protecting personal data, the limited data reten-
tion principle consists of attaching a lifetime to a data compliant 
with its acquisition purpose, after which it must be withdrawn 
from the system. The shorter the retention period is, the smaller 
the total amount of data needlessly exposed, reducing the impact 
of trail disclosure [3]. Beyond the protection of personal data, the 
limited data retention principle is also a cornerstone of the 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 recommendation for protecting enterprise 
information systems. 
However, the limited data retention principle is difficult to put in 
practice. In some countries, minimal retention periods can be 
fixed for law enforcement or legal processes purposes (e.g., bank-
ing information in UK cannot be destroyed before 7 years). In this 
case, the same retention limit is used for privacy preservation 
purposes, for which such limits are usually to large. For the large 
amount of data not covered by law, the retention limit is supposed 
to reflect the best compromise between privacy preservation and 
application purposes reach. In practice, the same data item is 
likely to serve different purposes, leading to selecting the largest 
retention limit compatible with all purposes, as suggested in [3]. 
Moreover, the purposes exposed in most privacy policies are 
fuzzy enough to defend very long retention limits (years or dec-
ades), denaturing the initial principle. As a consequence, retention 
limits are seen by civil rights organizations as a deceitful justifica-
tion for long term storage of personal data by companies.  
We propose a new approach which opens up an alternative to 
reason about and implement limited data retention. It is based on 
the assumption that long lasting purposes can often be satisfied 
with a less accurate, and therefore less sensitive, version of the 
data. The objective of the proposed approach is to progressively 
degrade the data after a given time period such that (1) the inter-
mediate states are informative enough to serve application pur-
poses and (2) the accurate state cannot be recovered by anyone 
after this period, not even by the server. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this approach is the first attempt to implement the essence 
of the limited data retention principle, which is limiting the reten-
tion of any information to the period strictly necessary to accom-
plish the purpose for which it has been collected. Hence, if the 
same information is collected to serve different purposes, de-
graded states of this information and their respective retention 
limits are defined according to each application purpose. 
By degrading attributes forming a quasi-identifier, k-
anonymisation [4] shares some similarities with our data degrada-
tion model. However, both models pursue different objectives. k-
Anonymisation transforms the database content such that the data 
of a single individual cannot be distinguished from the one of k-1 
other individuals. Thus, no other purposes than statistics computa-
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tions can be satisfied. By contrast, our data degradation model 
applies to attributes describing a recorded event while keeping the 
identity of the user intact. Hence, user-oriented purposes are pre-
served.  
The threat model considered by data degradation is the same as 
for limited data retention. It does the two following assumptions 
on the recording system (i.e., the DBMS): (1) the system imple-
ments without malice all security policies which have been de-
fined (including retention control); (2) the system cannot prevent 
all forms of attacks, negligence or weakly defined policies which 
could expose, at any given time, the personal digital trail of a 
victim to an adversary.  
In a trail disclosure resulting from a piracy attack, the adversary 
is a hacker or a dishonest employee breaking into the server with 
the objective to get access to a set of user’s digital trails (e.g., for 
a lucrative purpose) and the victims are the targeted users (poten-
tially all users of the system). In a trail disclosure resulting from a 
weak policy declaration, the adversary is anyone (e.g., an insurance 
or credit company, an employer, a governmental agency) having a 
particular interest to scrutinize the digital trail of an identified victim 
(e.g., a future client or employee, a suspect citizen). In a trail disclo-
sure resulting from a negligence, the adversary is anyone getting 
access to the disclosed digital trails (e.g., could be internet user in 
the AOL disclosure scandal) and the victim can be anyone having a 
singular personal digital trail (e.g., user 4417749 identified as 
Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old Georgian widow). 
Data degradation however, as any data retention model, cannot 
defeat trail disclosures performed by an adversary spying the 
database system from its creation. To be effective, such attack 
must be repeated with a frequency smaller than the duration of the 
shortest degradation step. Such continuous attacks are much more 
easily detectable thanks to Intrusion Detection Systems and Au-
diting Systems. Besides, data degradation is complementary to 
any access control techniques. 
An important question is whether data degradation can be rea-
sonably implemented in a DBMS.  Even guaranteeing that data 
cannot be recovered after a regular delete is not easy [1]. Data 
degradation is a more complex process which includes physical 
data deletion but impacts more thoroughly the data storage, in-
dexation, logging and locking mechanisms to deal with data trav-
ersing a sequence of states. As retention limits become shorter, 
the number of degradation steps increases and the performance 
problem arises. For more details we refer to [2]. 
2. MOTIVATING SCENARIO 
To illustrate our approach, we sketch here a concrete scenario 
where data degradation can be applied. It takes place in an or-
ganization which wants to provide new services to its employees, 
enabled by the analysis of employees’ web activity. Each internet 
access is captured as one tuple in a personal trail containing four 
attributes: ID is the employee’s identifier, URL is the resource 
locator of the visited page, TIME and DUR are respectively the 
date and the duration of the visit. 
Such personal trails are sensitive and may violate privacy if dis-
closed. Indeed, a full trail gives complete information about web 
activities (what, when and how long). Past timetables can be re-
constituted simply from attributes ID and TIME. Moreover, the 
full trail may give sensitive information about any given em-
ployee such as the delay before starting a task (reactivity), the 
time taken to accomplish a task (productivity), the time spent on 
useless or extra work activities, etc. Notice that we consider "an 
organization" in this scenario, but the privacy invasion is even 
stronger when tracking people within the private sphere.  
Examples of services enabled in such a context are: 
S1: Synchronous co-browsing. Employees can see the current web 
trail of colleagues. For example, people making a web survey to 
prepare a meeting may use this feature to search in parallel.  
S2: Asynchronous co-browsing. Each employee can retrieve the 
past web trails of other colleagues. This would enable people to 
suspend/resume investigations [5] 
S3: Passive co-browsing. Employees benefit from implicit feed-
back of colleagues, computed from their past trails. In particular, 
each link in visited web pages is complemented with statistics 
generated by colleagues having followed the link (e.g., name 
along with duration and frequency).  
S4: Profiling employees. HR department often requires employ-
ees’ domains of expertise, e.g., to identify interesting trainings to 
be proposed or to find the correct person to which delegating the 
organization of an event (e.g., a seminar). Domains of expertise 
are obtained from web trails (e.g., MySQL experts most probably 
visit mysql.com often and extensively).  
To fulfil its purpose, service S1 requires accurate recent histories 
(e.g., 1 day) to enable parallel investigations. S2 requires longer 
histories (e.g., 1 week) but with degraded attributes TIME and 
DUR: the date in days can replace the exact time in seconds; the 
exact duration can be degraded to a value from the domain Bi-
nary_dur = {short; long}. S3 requires even longer trails (e.g., 1 
month) and can be fulfilled with a TIME value expressed in weeks 
and a URL value degraded to its static part (i.e., the path without 
parameters, hence, no content generated based on users’ inputs). 
S4 requires long term trails (e.g., 1 year) with TIME in months 
and URL reduced to the domain subpart (e.g., “MySql.com”).  
3. RESEARCH AGENDA 
Data degradation strictly implements the limited retention princi-
ple, increasing privacy with respect to trail disclosures, without 
touching the ability for applications to reach its purposes. We 
already devised a simple and limited version of the degradation 
model [2]. Current work aims at a better understanding of the 
impact of degradation on traditional database technology. In the 
next steps, we investigate necessary extensions of the model in 
terms of flexibility and usability, where users are better involved 
into the degradation process (e.g., personalized degradation poli-
cies given optins purposes), and where the content of the data 
influences the degradation. 
4. REFERENCES 
[1] Stahlberg, P., Miklau, G., Levine, B.N. Threats to privacy in 
the forensic analysis of database systems. In SIGMOD, 2007 
[2] N. L. G. Anciaux, L. Bouganim, H. J. W. van Heerde, P. 
Pucheral, and P. M. G. Apers. InstantDB: Enforcing Timely 
Degradation of Sensitive Data. In ICDE, April 2008  
[3] Agrawal, R., Kiernan, J., Srikant, R., Xu, Y. Hippocratic 
databases. In VLDB, 2002 
[4] Sweeney, L. K-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. 
Int. Journal on Uncertainty Fuzziness and Knowledge-based 
Systems, 10, 5 (Oct. 2002) 
[5] Morris, M.R., Horvitz, E. SearchTogether: An Interface for 
Collaborative Web Search. Proceedings of ACM UIST 2007. 
1402
